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Personhood: The Conditions 
of Identification and Description 
Rev. Robert Barry, O.P. 
Father Barry, formerly of St. 
Mary's Dominican College, New 
Orleans, has recently been 
appointed to teach moral theol-
ogy in the department of reli-
gious studies at Providence Col-
lege, Providence, R.I. He credits 
Miss Jan Gonzales and Mr. Tim-
othy G. Schafer for assistance in 
the various legal aspects of this 
work. 
The pro-life movement bases its contentions that abortion is murder 
on the supposition that the developing stages of human life are per-
sons who merit the rights and protections of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. While many believe this presupposition to be valid and true, a 
study that manifests the grounds and reasons for this premise is lack-
ing. In this work, I wish to delineate briefly the conditions, events, 
states and processes that permit a justifiable ascription of personhood 
to the developmental states of human life. This work will fall far short 
of a proof of this postulate, but it may lend greater clarity to the 
pro-life position. I shall suggest here that the person must be under-
stood as an identifiable individual who is not only the subject and 
causal agent of certain material predicates, but is also the subject and 
causal agent of certain human states of mind and consciousness. And 
because the person is identifiable as such, personhood can be justi-
fiably attributed to the developing stages of life that indicate the 
presence of a subject and causal agent of human states of mind. 
Failure to ascribe personhood to these developing states will result in 
logical and legal dilemmas . (See Appendix.) 
If predication of the quality of personhood of the developing stages 
of life is going to be rationally feasible, then these stages must be 
shown to be not only states of the persons, but also to be states of 
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individuals who are readily identifiable and locatable. This is the case 
because persons as such are not identifiable and locatable, but can 
only be so identified as qualities of readily locatable and identifiable 
individuals. This fact makes it necessary to elucidate not only the 
particulars necessary for the identification of individuals , but also the 
various modes in which individuals can be identified. This study will 
proceed by first pointing out the characteristics of publicly identifi-
able individuals. Then it will delineate the modes employed to 
describe observed individuals in our perceptual and sensory matrix. 
The third section will then draw attention to the traits and characteris-
tics manifested by individuals who are properly and justifiably termed 
persons. A section dealing with the rights to existence of persons will 
conclude this essay. 
I. 
The Types of Individuality 
The most primitive type of individual is the material individual. 1 
Identification of all other types of individuals is contingent upon iden-
tification of them first as material individuals. But material individuals 
are members of the class of things. A thing is an observable logical 
unity of particulars. 2 But things cannot be properly termed individ-
uals, because some of them lack the logical structures and characteris-
tics that would permit them to be identified as individuals. Thus, gases 
and shafts of light are things, but not individuals because the logical 
structure and arrangement of their particulars does not permit them to 
be individuated. It is not possible to differentiate one body of gas 
from another, or to distinguish one ray of light as being distinct from 
another when there is no other material individual separating them. 
The class of material individuals possesses particulars that are 
arranged so as to permit observers to distinguish them clearly, and to 
identify them readily . In this section the particulars that serve to 
constitute a thing as an identifiable individual will be considered. They 
are : 
1) tangibility, resistance to touch , or operation in the tactile range, 
2) spatio-temporallocation, 
3) retention of the unity of particulars over a temporal duration, 
4) public observability, and 
5) facile reidentification. 3 
Identification of a thing as an individual is only possible if the thing 
being identified retains at least these characteristics and traits . The rea-
sons for these characteristics must be considered. 
1) Tangibility. The class of material individuals is the class that is 
the proper subject and causal agent of corporeal characteristics. This 
class is noted primarily by the fact that members of the class of 
material individuals retain the trait of resistance to touch. 4 Material 
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individuals are not noted primarily for their extension in space, or 
their solidity, but for their resistance to touch. This particular that 
inheres in material individuals separates them from those things that 
do not exhibit resistance to touch such as shafts of light. In more 
general terms, the class of material individuals is the class that pos-
sesses qualities in the tactile range. These qualities are locatable and 
identifiable when they are united to other types of particulars that 
mark the class of material objects and individuals. 
2) Spatio-temporal location. Identification of a thing as a material 
individual requires that the observed thing be locatable in a spatial and 
temporal framework. Particulars logically related to the thing must be 
observable as existing in spatio-temporal relations. 5 Identification 
requires that an observer be able to refer to particulars as existing 
"next to" or "under" or "above" other spatially referrable particulars 
and things . ' Also, the observer must be able to refer to particulars as 
existing "before" or "after" or "contemporaneous with" other partic-
ulars, events, processes or sequences that are identifiable and locat-
able. Identification of material bodies, and individuals is not hampered 
by the differences in specific particulars because of the fact that these 
particulars can be identified in many instances by their spatial and 
temporal location. 
Identification of a thing as a material individual not only implies 
that the material individual itself is identifiable, but also that the 
location in time and place of the individual's existence is also identi-
fiable. Without making prior reference to a particular identified indi-
vidual, an observer can know it and identify it simply by identifying 
its place in space and time. This is the case only with material individ-
uals because they are such that their location in place and time serves 
partially to identify them as things that are material individuals . 
3) Retention of particulars. The third factor that differentiates 
material individuals from other things, and that permits identification, 
is that their composite of particulars retains their observable character-
istics over an extended period of time. The color, dimensions, weight 
and texture of material individuals remain constant over time when 
compared to such things as fluids or rays of light. If material bodies 
and individuals did not retain these and other identifying particulars 
over a relatively extended period of time, then observers could not 
make continuous or repeated identifying references to them. Charac-
teristics and particulars that are protean or vanishing render it impos-
sible to observe individuality in sensible things. Constancy in these 
particulars is an exigence for the identification of things as material 
individuals. 
4) Public observability. The fourth condition necessary for identify-
ing a thing as a material individual is that the thing must be publicly 
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and commonly observable. 6 This condition eliminates such objects as 
concepts, emotions, perceptions or volitions from this class. This con-
dition is a general and imprecise criterion for identification, but it 
does serve to enable an observer to distinguish various types and 
classes of experiences and things. Members of the class of material 
individuals are publicly observable and generally referrable to any 
number of discrete observers. But members of such a class as that of 
private experiences and objects lack this characteristic. This means 
that quite distinct persons can literally see, touch or smell publicly 
observable material individuals, but cannot do this with members of 
the class of privately identifiable objects such as concepts, emotions or 
volitions that do not exist abidingly in a unitary spatio-temporal 
framework of reference. 
5) Facile reidentification. The fifth condition necessary for the 
identification of a thing as an individual is that the object be readily 
reidentifiable. The class of material objects is a class whose elements 
are all readily reidentifiable to observers because their unity of partic-
ulars exists enduringly in a spatio-temporal matrix. 7 In contrast to this 
condition found in members of the class of material individuals, such 
things as shafts of light, fluids or gases are not readily reidentifiable as 
the same thing that was previously observed. Facile reidentification of 
a thing means that it can be identified at one point in space and time 
as being a unity of observable particulars, and can be identified as the 
same unity of particulars again at a distinctly different point in either 
space or time. The scheme in which conscious observers operate is 
such that an individual located at one particular time and place can be 
easily described as the same individual at another time and place if the 
individual is a member of the class of material individuals. 
Reidentification takes place not only because observed unities of 
particulars in material individuals abide continuously, but also because 
the place and time in which material individuals are identified are also 
identifiable. S It is because of this that an observer can assert of a 
material individual that "It is the thing that I saw there." If place and 
time were not locatable and identifiable, then this form of identifica-
tion would not be possible. 
Facile reidentification is also possible with the class of material 
.individuals because identification of the individual is not simply an 
identification of the unity of particulars of the individual. Observers 
note that individuals, bodies, objects or things are identified as being 
more than just unities, conglomerations or constellations of specifics, 
particulars or traits. Particulars refer to the individuals who are identi-
fied, but they are not the objects of identification themselves. If it 
were the case that identifying references were made of particulars of 
individuals rather than of the individuals themselves, then changes or 
alterations in these particulars would make identification of the indi-
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viduals referred to impossible. 
Having briefly outlined the conditions required of a thing to be 
classified as an identifiable material individual, it is necessary to out-
line the modes in which identification of material individuals is made. 
II. 
The Modes of Identification 
This section shall consider the three modes in which identification 
of material individuals can properly occur: 
1) demonstrative identification, 
2) identifiability-dependence identification, and 
3) locatable sequential identification. 
1) Demonstrative identification. This is the most primitive form of 
identification. In this mode, an observer notes the individuality of the 
observed thing because of a unity of particulars that are distinct and 
unique while standing in a cause-effect relationship to the material 
individual .9 The particulars referred to in this mode of identification 
are of a type that is proper to the individual to which reference is 
being made, and are not proper to "any other individual . When an 
individual is described and identified as "the man with the red hair," 
for instance, identification is made by referring to particulars that are 
in immediate unity with the material individual being identified. The 
individual being identified stands as the material subject and causal 
agent of the particulars to which reference is being made. Identifica-
tion of the individual is made in this mode of identification because 
the particulars that are referred to cannot exist independently, but can 
only exist in a material subject that is a causal agent of these partic-
ulars. In this mode of reference and description, the subject of the 
observed particulars is not referred to by making prior references to 
particulars existing in immediate unity with other individuals and sub-
jects . In demonstrative identification, the particulars referred to by 
the observer are "owned" by the material individual because these 
particulars can only exist through the causal agency of the material 
subject. Identification of the subject is possible because the observed 
particulars serve to distinguish their subjects which are numerically 
distinct from other subjects which abide enduringly in our unitary, 
four dimensional, spatio-temporal framework of reference. In demon-
strative identification, the observed particulars refer immediately to 
the individuality of the material subject because the material subject 
alone is their causal agent. 
2) Identifiability-dependence identification. Objects of reference 
are described as individuals in this mode of identification because a 
unique and mathematically distinct subject of other existing particu-
lars is known by reference to other observed particulars . 10 Demon-
stration and description of a material individual in this mode of refer-
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ence rest upon the ability of an observer to observe particulars in one 
subject that refer in and of themselves to another discrete subject and 
individual. Identification of an individual in this mode is dependent 
upon identification of one unitary set of particulars in a subject that 
can refer the observer to another subject that is an independently 
existing material individual. In the case of an observer identifying a 
person as "the boy who was hit by John's car," the individual identi-
fied is referred to by particulars not immediately related to him. The 
boy is described and identified in this example by particulars that are 
causally related to another material individual. Identification of the 
boy is made because reference is made to particulars that are causally 
related to material individuals that are distinct from the boy, i.e., 
John's car. This mode of identification and description is as reliable 
and as certain as the demonstrative mode of identification when the 
uniting relationship between the observed particulars and the identi-
fied individual is shown and made manifest. Identification of the boy 
is certain when the relationship between the boy and John's car is 
clearly referred to by the speaker and the hearer. 
3) Locatable sequential identification. Identification of a thing as a 
material individual can justifiably occur when an observer can desig-
nate a subject of a unitary set of particulars as a member of an identi-
fiable and describable series or sequence. 11 Identification of a materi-
al individual in this mode is not contingent upon observation of partic-
ulars immediately related to any specific subject or individual. Rather, 
identification is contingent upon the ability of the observer to locate 
the material individual in a numerable series, process or sequence. In 
this mode of reference and description, an individual is referred to, for 
example, as the "n"th individual in series or sequence " K." It is pos-
sible, therefore, to locate and identify the individual if the series or 
sequence itself can be located and identified. 
If these conditions are accepted as the most general and common 
modes of identification, then it is relevant to consider the ways in 
which they are applied to the identification of higher types of material 
individuals. Consideration will now be given to the particulars that 
distinguish animate individuals and persons from other things. Given 
the fact that these types of individuals are members of the class of 
material individuals, the means of identifying them will be the same as 
those used to identify members of the class of material bodies. 
III. 
Animate Individuals and Their Defining Particulars 
For the purpose of this work, which is to outline the conditions 
that permit proper identification of individuals as persons, we shall 
now consider animate individuals as a unique type of material indi-
viduals. And the class of animate individuals shall be further considered 
February, 1978 69 
as divided into those who possess self-mobility and those who lack this 
characteristic. We are most interested here in the particulars which 
distinguish those individuals who retain locomotion. The particulars 
that constitute them as animate individuals are: 
1) growth from immanent sources, 
2) states of consciousness that permit responsive reflexes, 
3) perceptual thought, and 
4) origination and termination of these states in time. 
Animate individuals retain all of these characteristics that material 
individuals possess, and also retain these particulars that furnish 
grounds for their uniqueness and distinction. Let us examine these 
particulars more closely. 
1) Growth from immanent sources. Essential to the class of animate 
individuals is the fact that their growth is derived from internal and 
immanent sources. Growth in these individuals is not simply an addi-
tion of greater mass or volume, but is usually the entering into a 
condition where higher orders of functioning and responsiveness are 
actualized. 
2) Responsive states of consciousness. A fundamental distinction 
between animate and inanimate individuals is found in the ability of 
animate individuals to exhibit states of mind that permit the individ-
ual to respond to conditions, events and processes that are immanent 
to their environment. Response should be understood here as the act 
whereby the individual selects one possible option among some or 
many in reaction to an immanent or distant stimulus. Distinguishing 
the more sophisticated and complex animate organisms is possible by 
determining their range of responsive options. 
3) Perceptual thought. A trait that is evident in some members of 
the class of animate individuals is perceptual thought. In this form of 
thought, the individual is able to think and form intramental images 
only of objects, things and individuals that are perceptually pres-
ent. 12 The responsive behavior of animate individuals is grounded on 
the presence in them of thought that refers to the perceptually appre-
hended present. Many individuals in this class can generalize, discrim-
inate, abstract and solve problems by trial and error. But this form of 
thought does not permit animate individuals to respond to environ-
mental circumstances by judging, thinking about individuals and 
objects that are not perceptually present, or reasoning about necessary 
and contingent relations among perceptually present individuals and 
subjects. 
4) Origination and termination of these states. Quite evident to any 
intelligent observer is the fact that the states of immanent animation, 
responsiveness to cues from an environment, and perceptual thought 
originate and terminate in time. This is not the case with material 
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individuals, for there is no observation that states such as these begin 
and end in them. With the termination of these states, the intelligible 
unity of the animate individual ceases. 
These are the distinguishing characteristics of animate material indi-
viduals. Now the characteristics that distinguish persons from animate 
individuals and material individuals must be considered. 
IV. 
Person Predicates 
In this section, I shall describe the conditions necessary for the 
identification of an animate organism as a person. It is quite possible 
to describe developing stages of life as material and animate individ-
uals, but to describe these stages as persons is another matter. Doing 
so will require the presence of evidence of particularly personal char-
acteristics in these stages of life. Evidence must be available of traits 
that are not found in other classes of individuals, and that mark the 
stages of developing life as being stages in the development of a unique 
type of individual. The traits and characteristics of the person must 
therefore be clarified here. 
Personhood is not strictly equivalent to individual consciousness, 
pure consciousness, embodied ego, or embodied anima.13 Rather than 
being coterminous with these notions, personhood is more properly 
understood as that quality by which an individual stands as a causal 
subject of private human experiences such as dreams, volitions, emo-
tions and concepts. 14 The person is one who "owns" these private 
states and processes. The concept of the person is that of an individual 
who stands as the causal subject of willing, thinking, emoting and 
experiencing specifically human states and actions. This is a concept 
which is crucial to our conceptual and perceptual framework because 
it permits human states of consciousness and mind to be identified, 
described and "owned." 15 If this concept were lacking, then it would 
be impossible to identify the private actions, states and processes 
which are experienced by humans. 
It should be noted even further that the concept of the person is 
unique. The person is a "compound individual" because it is the causal 
subject of both corporeal and personal traits and predicates,16 and 
thus the person is readily identifiable and locatable. If persons were 
not subjects of these two types of predicates, it would not be possible 
to identify and reidentify them. The fact that persons are compound 
individuals means that human states of mind and consciousness can be 
located and identified in our unitary spatio-temporal framework of 
reference. 
The specific characteristics that identify the class of persons are: 
1) conceptual thought, 
2) syntactical and propositional speech, 
3) intentional expression, 
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4) non-public observability of its states, and 
5) a non-transferable character of these states. 
1) Conceptual thought. The characteristic of conceptual thought is 
found only in the class of persons. Conceptual thought enables the 
individual to judge, think of objects that are not perceptually present 
and reason about the necessary and contingent relations existing be-
tween things.17 Conceptual thought is distinct from perceptual 
thought, and cannot be reduced to perceptual thought because it 
knows objects with insight and understanding. Conceptual thought 
enables the subject to gain insight into the nature, state and relation of 
things. This insight gained through conceptual thought enables the 
subject to understand intelligently the object of thought and ration-
ally affirm this insight and understanding. 
2) Syntactical and propositional speech. This characteristic is found 
in its complete form only in the class of persons. It is the capability to 
use syntactical and propositional forms of vocal utterance to commun-
icate insights, understandings and intelligently formed emotions. It is 
unlimited in its capability and is not stimulus bound.18 The use of 
syntactical and propositional speech from natural causes implies an 
understanding and insight into its usages. The utterance of a proposi-
tional sentence by an animal is not aptly considered a speech usage 
because the animal cannot demonstrate an insight into his utterances 
by providing a rational, coherent and intelligent explanation and 
account of the circumstances, conditions and reasons for the utterance 
of the sentence. But persons who employ syntactical and proposition-
al speech with understanding are able to provide this account in most 
circumstances when asked. 
3) Intentional expression. A further distinguishing trait and charac-
teristic of persons is that they retain the capability of expressing inten-
tions and volitions. This expression is also conscious, intelligent and 
rational. It sometimes exhibits itself in speech, art, ritual, myth and 
symbolic behavior. There is little indication that other types of indi-
viduals exhibit the range of forms of intentional expression that are 
found in persons. While other animate individuals may act intention-
ally and purposively , only persons can express the wide range of inten-
tions that they possess. 
4) Non-public observability. The states of mind and consciousness 
retained by persons are private and non-observable to public observ-
ers.19 The states of mind present in persons are private to them and 
cannot be referred to, described or immediately identified by any 
other individual than the persons who are experiencing them as their 
own states of mind and consciousness. 
5) Non-transferability. The above mentioned states of mind and 
consciousness are not capable of being transferred to other individ-
uals.20 The private emotions, thoughts, intentions and intramentaily 
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formed propositions cannot be transferred to other individuals. The 
products of these states of mind can be communicated to other indi-
viduals by various means, but these states of mind are non-transfer-
rable in themselves . 
Traits to Distinguish Persons 
These are the traits by which persons are distinguished from other 
animate and material individuals . The circumstances and condition in 
which one can ascribe personhood to individuals who manifest the 
presence of these traits must be clarified . 
First, person predicates are ascribed to one's own animate individ-
uality when observed actions indicate the presence of a subject causing 
human states of mind and consciousness that are related to specific 
private acts of willing, conceptualizing, emoting or intending. 21 It is 
justifiable to predicate personhood in this circumstance because it is 
the only predicate that will adequately explain and account for the 
presence and causal structure of the observed states of mind and con-
sciousness. If personhood is not ascribed in this circumstance, then 
one must explain the observed states of mind as being causally related 
to merely a material or animate individual. But doing this will not 
enable one to account for the fact that other animate individuals do 
not manifest these same states of mind and consciousness. 
The second condition in which it is proper to attribute personhood 
to an animate individual occurs when observed actions in other indi-
viduals are peculiarly human and personal. 22 It is proper to ascribe 
personhood to the discrete individual who manifests these attributes 
when that attribution alone will provide adequate explanation for the 
observed human and personal actions. When another individual mani-
fests conceptual thought, intentional expression, syntactical and prop-
ositional speech, and intelligent insight and understanding into these 
actions, then only the attribution of personhood will sufficiently 
explain the behavior of the individual . 
The third case in which it is justified to ascribe personhood to 
animate individuals occurs when one's own animate individuality 
indicates the presence of a subject which is capable of being causally 
related to human states of mind and consciousness. 23 This is the case 
because personhood is not contingent upon the actualization or 
functioning of specifically human modes of action. If this were not 
the case, then one whose consciousness was in a sleep state would not 
be appropriately defined as a person because conceptual thought, 
intentional expression and synti'ctical and propositional speech would 
not be actively employed in that condition. Personhood is aptly 
attributed to animate individuals who retain the power to employ 
human and personal states of mind. It is not limited to those individ-
uals who are employing human capabilities, but to those who retain 
the capability to employ these states in action. 
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The fourth condition in which personhood is appropriately applied 
to an individual occurs when other individuals manifest the capability 
of causing human states of mind, and of "owning" human actions and 
states of consciousness. 24 This assertion is warranted because the 
predication of material or animate predicates in this condition will not 
adequately explain the behavior of the individual. Personhood is 
ascribed to the infant, for example, because it is capable of mani-
festing and performing specifically human actions of conceptual think-
ing, intentional expression and syntactical and propositional speech. It 
is not termed a person because it is exhibiting those states of mind 
during its periods of infancy, but because of its capability to cause 
human forms of action and to stand as the subject of human states of 
mind and consciousness. 
It should also be noted that individuals who have the capability to 
be self and other ascribers of personhood can appropriately be defined 
as persons. Individuals who can perform these two distinct types of 
actions with insight and understanding can aptly be termed persons. 
Having clarified the particulars which identify animate individuals 
as persons, it is necessary to consider the possibility that developing 
stages of life may be developing stages of persons, and not just devel-
oping stages of material or animate individuals. 
V. 
Developing Life: Its Individuality and Personhood 
Against those who would deny that the developing stages of life are 
discrete and distinct individuals, it has to be affirmed here that they 
are materially and numerically distinct from all other individuals. It is 
not terribly difficult to show that they are animate individuals for 
they exhibit growth from immanent sources which result in more 
complex forms of existence. But these stages of developing life are 
also individuals because they are numerically distinct and can be iden-
tified by demonstrative identification, identifiability-dependence 
identification, and locatable sequential identification. What clarifies 
their uniqueness and individuality, however, is their unique genetic 
structure. From the moment of genotyping, the developing stages of 
life retain a genetic coding which is absolutely unique in the world, 
and cannot be duplicated except in the case of identical twins. 25 This 
unrepeatable genetic structure causes a distinct and unique form of 
behavior in the developing stages of life. The actions and processes 
exhibited by this thing from the moment of its genetic coding make 
evident its distinctiveness in relation to surrounding cells and organs. 
From the moment of its genetic coding, the zygote begins to "pat-
tern" the activity of its surrounding dependent cells. And in contrast 
to cells which are not derived from the zygote, this cell initiates the 
development of a primitive neurological structure shortly after it is 
formed. If the zygote and the subsequent developing stages of life 
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were not considered to be animate individuals, then it would follow 
that from the point of genetic coding, they would be distinct cells 
from those in their environment. But this is not witnessed by any 
serious observer. The developing stages of life, while dependent on 
their host for nourishment and protection, are distinct from their host 
by reason of their distinct genetic structure and developmental proces-
ses. If, on the contrary, one were to assert that the developing stages 
of life were not distinct from their su.rroundings, then one would have 
to explain why their processes were distinct from the processes of 
surrounding cells and organs. One would have to also explain why this 
supposedly homogenous entity retains a distinct and unique genetic 
structure. 
If it is accepted that the zygote is an animate individual, then 
consideration must be given to the possibility of it being a person. It is 
more difficult to show that the developing stages of life are stages in 
the development of the person because they exhibit few of the com-
mon characteristics that we ordinarily associate with persons. We 
usually conceive of the person as a being with whom we can converse, 
do business, and reason, for example. And it is difficult to perform 
these very common and ordinary interpersonal activities with the 
developing stages of life that we are trying to consider as persons here. 
It is necessary to investigate the grounds for assigning personhood to the 
developing stages of life. 
It is not possible to assign these stages to the category of animate 
individuals alone because this would imply that they transfer into the 
category of persons at some later time. This would imply that the 
acquisition of some characteristic or trait at a later time would justify 
their transfer into the category of persons. It is not possible to con-
ceive of these developing stages acquiring a quality or state that would 
permit this transfer. If linguistic usage, for instance, were the acquired 
characteristic, then animals such as baboons or porpoises which 
exhibit a form of linguistic usage would be categorizable as persons. 
Or, if one asserted as another possible basis for this transfer the case of 
conceptual thought, one would face a similar difficulty. For, if this 
were the case, then it should be possible for other higher forms of 
animate life to acquire this trait also because conceptual thought 
would then be transferable. But this does not seem to be the case. It 
does not seem possible at the present time to transfer the capacity for 
conceptual thought to animals and animate individuals which have 
only the capability for perceptual thought. In summary, the develop-
ing stages of life cannot be aptly categorized as animate individuals. 
Doing so would imply that a future acquired characteristic would 
justify their transfer to the category of persons. And this is logically 
equivalent to equating personhood with that acquired characteristic. 
Entailed in this is the possibility that any other animate individual 
which can come to retain that characteristic can, by logical right, be 
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termed a person. If the developing stages of life cannot alone be 
termed animate individuals, then the grounds for predicating person-
hood of them must be shown. 
Characteristics of Stages of Life 
There are five characteristics manifested by the developing stages of 
life which warrant the predication of personhood of these stages. The 
developing stages of life are: 
1) subjects of developing human states of mind and consciousness, 
2) subjects of developing human actions, 
3) causal agents of these developing states and actions, 
4) causal subjects of these states, and the only material individuals 
who can be said to "own" these states, and 
5) the only animate individuals who can permit identification and 
description of these states of mind and consciousness. 
It should not be thought that the developing states such as the zygote, 
embryo and fetus are three distinct persons. They should be conceived 
of as developing stages of the person and not as three discrete persons. 
These characteristics must now be considered more fully. 
1) The states of mind and consciousness which are later manifested 
in mature and fully developed individuals come to maturity and grow 
in the developing stages of life. Conceptual thought, intentional 
expression and syntactical and propositional speech do not erupt into 
the world without a period of development and growth. They do 
develop, and the locus of their development is the phases of develop-
ment of the human biological individual. And because these biological 
individuals are the focal points of their development, these individuals 
must be considered as persons. It must be recalled that the person is 
not the individual who employs human states of mind, but rather is 
the individual who has the capability to employ these states. 
2) Human actions of speech, intentional expression and conceptual 
thought must occur in an identifiable individual because they are not 
identifiable in and of themselves. If they simply occurred without 
being identifiable, then they would strike us as being the product of 
some psychosis or disorder. The human actions of speech develop-
ment, developing conceptual thought and developing intentional 
expression occur in the developing biological stages of life. These 
developing human actions are verifiable human actions, and they are 
identifiable as such because they occur in an identifiable animate 
individual. The developing stages of life are stages in the growth of the 
person, and not just of animate individuals because their existence 
permits developing human actions to be identifiable in our framework 
of reference. 
3) The developing stages of human life are causal agents of develop-
ing states of mind and consciousness in that they are the states which 
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permit persons to be identified and described in our perceptual 
matrix. Because the person is the subject of human states of mind, it 
causes them to exist and be intelligible in our framework of reference. 
The developing states of life are conditions of persons because they 
are compound individuals which are the subjects of material and per-
sonal predicates. And being the subject of both types of predicates, 
the developing stages of life make these person-predicates intelligible 
to public observers. 
4) The developing stages of life as stages in the growth of the person 
are persons because they "own" the developing states of mind. It is 
not possible to subscribe to a "no ownership" theory of human states 
of mind and still have a coherent image of our perceptual framework. 
The theory would hold that states of consciousness could not be 
properly ascribed to any material individual, and it ultimately con-
tends that states of mind are unidentifiable and indefinable. So, if 
states of mind must be ascribed to anything, they should be ascribed 
to the animate individual who experiences them as private, personal 
and incapable of being transferred to any other individual. If the 
developing stages of consciousness are to be "owned" by any animate 
or material individual, they should be owned by the individual who 
experiences them as private. Thus the developing stages of life should 
be considered as states in the development of the person because they 
permit private experiences to be claimed with justification and identi-
fied. 
5) No other animate individual has the capability of ascribing devel-
oping states of consciousness to himself in the same manner that the 
developing human biological individuals do. All other animate indi-
viduals will refuse to claim as their own the states of mind which the 
developing human individual claims as a personal possession. All other 
ascribers of personhood would designate those states of mind as 
belonging to that individual and not to themselves. 
The developing states of human life are states of the person because 
they are capable of beir!g self-ascribers of personhood, and other 
ascribers of personhood. They possess this capacity with an insight 
and an understanding of its meaning, implication, entailment and con-
sequences. They are also persons because these are done rationally and 
intelligently. Animals may ascribe personhood to themselves and to 
others, but they cannot do this with insight, intelligence and rational-
ity. 
It is not proper to deny personhood to the developing stages of life 
because their capacities are not fully developed and actualized. This is 
the case, again, because personhood is not a function of the employ-
ment of capabilities in a subject. The person is not the one who acts in 
a fashion that is similar to what we ordinarily call a person. The 
person is the subject and causal agent of actions and states of mind 
and consciousness which are specifically human. Personhood is attrib-
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uted to animate individuals which have the capability for conceptual 
thought, intentional expression and syntactical and propositional 
speech, and not to those individuals who employ these forms of 
action. 
It is now pertinent to ask what rights the person has who exists as a 
developing form of human biological life because contemporary ethi-
cists contend that the developing stages of life do not have an absolute 
and unconditioned right to life since exercise of that right entails the 
use of another person's body. 
VI. 
The Right to Life 
If it is true that the developing stages of life have no right to life 
because exercise of that right entails the use of another's body, then it 
would be true that developing stages of life which are brought to 
maturity in test tubes and laboratories would have a right to life that 
is denied naturally born persons.26 Only the most morally obtuse 
could agree that this should be the case. The use of another's body 
does not deny a person the right to exercise his right to life. This can 
be shown by an analysis of the value inherent in persons which pro-
hibi ts denial of their righ t to life. 
The value, sanctity and unconditioned right to exercise one's right 
to life derives from the value that God the Creator imputes to human 
life.27 The value or worth of an individual is established by its creator 
and by those who employ it. The value of an object is not determined 
solely by those who have use of an object or individual, but is consti-
tuted in part by its makers. The dignity of man is an "alien dignity" 
because it is bestowed by God. It is "loaned" to man by God so that 
this value and dignity may be used by man to give praise to God. And 
entailed in this act of giving praise is the giving of life, value, dignity 
and worth to others by participating in their creation. Giving praise 
implies that persons participate in the bestowing of life, dignity and 
worth on others. Allowing another person to make use of one's body 
is a form of giving praise to God because it is an act by which another 
person is created and receives an absolute and unconditioned worth 
and value. Allowing another to use one's body so that the other per-
son may use the life bestowed upon him fulfills the divine command 
to give praise by bestowing dignity, worth and value on others. 
If one were to reject this analysis of the value of human life, there is 
still another basis for asserting the unconditioned value and worth of 
human life. If one were to deny that the value of human life is derived 
from divine gifts, then it could be argued that the value of persons at 
any stage of their development comes from their potential actions. 
Persons have the capability of conferring higher orders, logics and 
meanings on our universe. 28 Persons have an absolute right to life 
because there are no other existing individuals or classes of indi-
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viduals who can subordinate the values that man can impute to his 
universe. The values, logics and orders that man can integrate into the 
universe are superior to all other orders, and because of this, they have 
a right to exist absolutely. But these values are not created by isolated 
and discrete individuals. They are the product of the whole human 
community, and because they are the product of this totality of 
human persons, the totality of human persons has the right to exist 
absolutely. For if one denies a right to exist unconditionally to a 
member of a particular class of individuals, one is logically compelled 
to deny this right to all members of the class. Therefore, if one denies 
a member of the class of persons a right to exist absolutely because 
that member's contributions to the development of human life are 
inconsequential, one is logically bound to deny this right to almost all 
the members of the class of human persons. This is the case because 
only an infinitesimally small number of persons can claim truly monu-
mental contributions to the advancement of human life. Persons have 
an absolute right to life because they are members of a class of individ-
uals which has an undetermined potential for integrating higher logics, 
orders and meanings into the existence of the universe. This, and not 
the value of individual contributions to the uplifting of human life, 
gives persons their right to life. 
At any given time, a person is a quantity of unknown value. One 
can never know when an action, discovery, or insight of inestimable 
value will occur in one's life. One only has to witness the cases of 
Newton and Archimedes to verify this. The discoveries and insights of 
individuals such as these, who can never be known before their dis-
coveries are made, far outstrip the hardship and difficulties created by 
persons of lesser genius and accomplishment. To destroy individuals 
simply because their existence causes physical inconvenience for a 
short duration of time, runs the serious risk of destroying individuals 
whose possible genius can advance human development by immeasur-
able lengths. Destroying individuals for these reasons seriously risks 
the danger of destroying those capable of radically advancing human 
development and life. 
Persons have an unconditional right to life, and this is one of the 
elements of their distinctiveness. Material and animate organisms have 
only a conditioned right to life. Their exercise of their right to life is 
absolute except in circumstances where their existence threatens 
harm, injury or loss to persons, or where the termination of their 
existence is needed for the protection or nourishment of persons. The 
right to life of persons is absolute except where it is voluntarily and 
willfully forsaken by the individual. A person forsakes his right to life 
when he becomes an immediate, immanent and proximate threat to 
the existence or health of another person. Beyond this circumstance, 
there is no situation wherein a person's right to life can be subordin-
ated to some other value. To grant only a conditioned right to life to 
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persons is equivalent to reducing them to the classes of material and 
animate individuals. To deny unconditioned rights to life to persons is 
equivalent to degrading them to the level of material or animate indi-
viduals . 
Conclusion 
In this work, I have tried to show the logical necessity of ascribing 
personhood to the developing stages of life. It is necessary to describe 
and identify these stages as persons because of the conditions prevail-
ing in our perceptual and sensory framework of reference. These con-
ditions govern and dictate the means by which individuals and human 
states of mind and consciousness are identified and claimed. Denial of 
the personhood of these stages of life calls into question the condi-
tions of identification and description employed by all observers . 
There is, however, another reason for ascribing personhood to the 
developing stages of life which is more pragmatic, and possibly more 
convincing. Denial of the personhood of these individuals entails that 
they are only animate organisms. And if they are only living organ-
isms, then it is logically conceivable that they could be used as one 
would any other living organism. This implies that they could hypo-
thetically be consumed for their nutritional value without necessitat-
ing any moral strictures. This absurd and inhuman condition is a log-
ical outcome of the premise that the developing stages of life are not 
persons with an absolute right to life. While it is wholly inconceivable 
that anyone would ever attempt such an atrocity, there is no substan-
tial logical basis for prohibiting it if the personhood of the developing 
stages of life is denied. 
Appendix 
The Roe us. Wade decision has created ambiguities for many stat-
utes, laws, ordinances and regulations which refer to the treatment 
and care offered to the remains of the deceased . Most of these statutes 
and regulations are concerned with the maintenance of public health 
and sanitation . They regulate the disposal of deceased "human per-
sons" or " dead human bodies." And because they refer to these legal-
ly defined E~ntities, they do not strictly apply to the remains of 
aborted embryos or fetuses which are not classified by law as "dead 
persons" or "deceased persons ." Thus, such statutes as that which 
governed the decision in The State us. Bradbury, 136 Me, 9A2d 657, 
are not applicable to one who consumed the remains of a legally 
aborted fetus with the mother's permission because the fetus is not a 
person meriting the protection of this statute. What this means is that 
mutilation and improper disposition of the bodies of aborted fetuses 
and embryos are not punishable by law . Statutes and regulations gov-
erning the disposition of the remains of the deceased are inapplicable 
because aborted fetuses are not considered to be persons. What has 
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been traditionally considered to be cannibalism - the eating of the 
remains of the dead - is not punishable by law when it is the remains 
of the human fetus which are consumed. 
The unauthorized mutilation of the remains of deceased persons is 
an offense against common law (State us. Aitkens, 352 Mo. 746, 179 
Sw sd 657). This decision does not apply to aborted fetuses which are 
mutilated because they are denied the rights and protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The anti-abortion statutes which have stood for so long existed to 
prevent even the slightest possibility of actions such as this escaping 
legal penalty. The Roe decision is so dangerous because it has estab-
lished legal permission for such actions. It is inconceivable that these 
actions would ever occur, but ten years ago, the Charles Manson story 
was inconceivable. At least then, there were laws that permitted him 
to be punished. 
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